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Emerging Human Rights Obligations for Non-State Actors






States are the main actors in the international law of human rights. They are the law-makers, in the sense that intergovernmental organisations adopt treaties that individual states can ratify, and non-binding instruments to which states have committed themselves. Further, they play an important role in the monitoring and enforcement of obligations under human rights instruments in the context of political organs such as the recently established UN Human Rights Council, successor of the UN Commission on Human Rights. States express their consent to be bound by international rules and have created monitoring mechanisms under a number of human rights treaties, thus advancing accountability. International organs composed of independent experts, such as the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee), play a major role in making states’ obligations more concrete and in enhancing compliance with the obligations they have undertaken. The establishment of monitoring mechanisms has thus contributed significantly to the strengthening of international human rights law. 

States are, however, not the only actors that have an impact on human rights of individuals. Non-state actors, such as international organisations, transnational corporations and individuals, are also capable of infringing on human rights. The role of such actors at the domestic and international level has changed in the past decades. In many cases they play a role as important as states. The European Union, for example, is an important actor in the international arena, but it is – so far – not a party to any human rights treaty. The activities of other international organisations, such as the United Nations and its specialised agencies, also affect human rights. Organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can take actions that facilitate the promotion of human rights, but also either directly violate human rights or indirectly by more or less forcing states into non-compliance with obligations under human rights treaties. For example, where the World Bank requires states to maintain or even increase fees for primary education, instead of abolishing them as required under Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), it contributes to the state’s non-compliance with its obligations under international human rights law. Yet these organisations do not (and, at present, cannot) ratify human rights instruments and cannot be called on to submit periodic reports to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESC Committee) – although the latter may issue recommendations to specialised agencies under Article 22 ICESCR.​[1]​ Thus, they are not held accountable before the international monitoring bodies. The extent of their obligations to respect and protect human rights is the subject of much debate.​[2]​ 

Transnational corporations can be more powerful than the government that hosts them. Also their activities can have a great influence on the enjoyment of human rights; for example, they can discriminate against women in remuneration or profit from forced labour. States may be unwilling or incapable of holding them accountable for their behaviour. As a consequence, infringements on human rights committed by enterprises often remain unaddressed. The same can be said about armed groups distinct of the armed forces of a state exercising control over a territory. They are often involved in human rights violations, including violations of women’s human rights. Such groups exercise power over territory and individuals; yet they are not in a position to ratify international human rights instruments. 

The situation is somewhat different for private individuals. Whereas actions of the above-mentioned non-state actors remain unaddressed by states because of their strong position vis-à-vis the state, impunity for human rights violations by private individuals is generally not so much the result of their powerful position, but of a failure of the state to exercise due diligence in preventing and combating violations.

Since states do not always take the necessary measures to prevent and combat violations by non-state actors, there are numerous instances in which non-state actors are not held accountable at the domestic level for their behaviour, and human rights violations are not remedied. Furthermore, non-state actors cannot be held accountable under procedures established under international human rights instruments. Only states ratify such instruments and accept the competence of organs monitoring the implementation of standards. Hence, in case of an infringement of human rights by a non-state actor, states can be held accountable at the international level if, for example, they failed to act with due diligence to prevent or respond to the infringement. There is thus a gap in the protection of human rights. This has been recognised in the past decades and various initiatives have been taken to try to fill this gap. 






As was mentioned in the introduction, states are the main actors in international law; they create international law and can accept obligations under treaties. Human rights treaties constitute a special category of treaties in international law. Whereas most treaties regulate relations between states, human rights treaties primarily regulate relations between states and individuals. States parties to human rights treaties are under an obligation to take measures to prevent and combat violations of treaty obligations by its agents, such as police officials and civil servants. If the state party fails to do so, it is directly responsible for these violations, and can be held accountable under international law.​[3]​ 

Additionally, human rights treaties require states parties to take measures to ensure that individuals do not violate each others’ rights. This implies, inter alia, that states must prohibit certain acts of individuals and other actors – under certain circumstances even criminalise behaviour – and ensure enforcement of such legislation. Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Convention) is quite elaborate on the different obligations of states. It requires states parties to guarantee equality and non-discrimination in the law, to ensure that public authorities and institutions do not discriminate (Article 2 (d)) and to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination any person, organisation or enterprise (Article 2 (e)). As a consequence of the scope of the definition of discrimination in Article 1 of the CEDAW Convention, this obligation does not only extend to the public sphere, but also to the private sphere. The relevance of this can hardly be underestimated. Like other human rights instruments, the CEDAW Convention obliges states parties to take measures to eliminate discrimination by state organs and public organs in the public sphere. They are, for example, under an obligation to eliminate discrimination in employment. The CEDAW Convention goes much further than that by also requiring steps to eliminate discrimination in private life, both by state organs, public organs, private enterprises and persons. For example, under Article 16 of the CEDAW Convention, dealing with equality within marriage, states parties are under an obligation, inter alia, to ensure ‘the same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children’. According to the CEDAW Committee this implies that decisions to have children or not, ‘while preferably made in consultation with spouse or partner, must not nevertheless be limited by spouse, parent, partner or Government’.​[4]​

The obligation to protect individuals from each other can be derived from states’ general obligation to not only respect human rights, but also from the obligation to protect. In its general comment on the nature of obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Human Rights Committee stated that: 

‘the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application between private persons or entities. There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure Covenant rights as required by Article 2 would give rise to violations by States Parties of those rights, as a result of States Parties’ permitting or failing to take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities.’​[5]​

Even though various human rights can be applied in horizontal relations – including the right not to be subjected to ill-treatment – this does not lead to accountability of private actors under international human rights law. In this context, the Human Rights Committee has pointed to the need for states parties to provide effective remedies under Article 2 (3) of the Covenant,​[6]​ in order to ensure that individuals whose rights have been violated have access to a remedy at the domestic level. 

Only in narrowly defined circumstances can individuals be brought before an international criminal court or tribunal for violations of international crimes such as war crimes or crimes against humanity that include sexual violence.​[7]​ The codification of various sexual offences as international crimes reflects the consensus reached at the international level on the seriousness of these crimes and the progress made in the recognition of such offences as a violation of women’s right to physical integrity. It may contribute to combating impunity for these grave human rights violations, also at the national level. Various human rights treaty bodies have pointed to states parties’ responsibilities under human rights instruments, which may have been inspired by developments in international criminal law. For example, recent concluding comments of the Committee against Torture (CAT Committee) display an interest of this human rights organ for sexual violence. For example, in the case of Burundi, the CAT Committee stated that it was ‘alarmed at reports of large-scale sexual violence against women and children by state officials and members of armed groups, as well as at the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war, which constitutes a crime against humanity’. The CAT Committee expressed its deep concern at the apparent impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators of such acts, and the extrajudicial or amicable settlement of rape cases, including by the administrative authorities, when emphasis is placed on practices such as marriage between rapist and victim.​[8]​ Until recently, the CAT Committee did not pay much attention to gender-based violence. Concluding Comments such as these thus constitute a step forward. First, because the CAT Committee specifically deals with gender-based violence, categorising the acts as a crime against humanity and rejecting impunity and practices apparently aimed at ‘restoring the honour’ of the rape victim is an improvement. Second, its dealing with acts committed by state officials as well as members of armed forces is another improvement. Since Article 1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment limits the definition of torture to acts ‘inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity’, the fact that the comments refer to members of armed groups under the heading of torture is significant. 

In this context, it is noteworthy that developments are taking place towards the accountability of staff members of UN peace-keeping operations for sexual exploitation and abuse. A report of the UN Secretary-General, drawn up by his adviser His Royal Highness Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, contains various recommendations to ensure that peace-keeping personnel who commit acts of sexual exploitation and abuse are held individually accountable through appropriate disciplinary action, that they are held financially accountable for the harm they have done to victims and that they are held criminally accountable if the acts constitute crimes under applicable law.​[9]​ The report points to the problems in cases where a functioning judicial system is absent in some peace-keeping locations. It is recommended that the Secretary-General establish a group of experts to study the issue and make recommendations to the General Assembly on whether an international convention or other means could be used to ensure that United Nations staff and experts on mission who commit defined crimes in peace-keeping areas are held criminally accountable for their actions.​[10]​

In spite of the fact that under human rights treaties, individuals and other non-state actors cannot be held accountable before international organs, states can be held responsible under certain circumstances for conduct of non-state actors. For example, individuals can submit complaints before an international organ about the failure of states parties to take the necessary measures to prevent and combat domestic violence.​[11]​ The first case dealt with on the merits by the CEDAW Committee clearly illustrates this case in point. A Hungarian woman had been the victim of domestic violence. She had been severely beaten for a long time by her common-law husband. She could not find refuge in a shelter because there was no shelter available that could take her as well as her children, one of whom was disabled. The court did not impose a restraining order on her abusive partner, and the sentence ultimately imposed on him was very lenient. The CEDAW Committee concluded that Hungary had violated various provisions of the CEDAW Convention, inter alia, by not taking the necessary measures to end the violence to which the woman had been subjected, to protect her and to punish the perpetrator.​[12]​ 

This illustrates the current system. The state party is held accountable before the CEDAW Committee for the failure to act, not the perpetrator who is responsible for the domestic violence. In its recommendations, the state party was urged to take ‘immediate and effective measures to guarantee the physical and mental integrity of A.T. and her family; and ensure that A.T. is given a safe home in which to live with her children, receives appropriate child support and legal assistance and that she receives reparation proportionate to the physical and mental harm undergone and to the gravity of the violations of her rights’.​[13]​ The Committee can only issue a recommendation for the state party to remedy the violation suffered by the victim, not to impose a specific punishment on the perpetrator. In this respect, it must be noted that the Committee formulated recommendations to prevent similar violations in the future, including to bring offenders to justice. 

The primary role of states in the promotion and protection of human rights may also be illustrated by the example of privatisation and the response thereto by international monitoring bodies. In various instances, states have privatised tasks that were traditionally mainly their responsibility, such as the management of prisons and the provision of health services. The privatisation of such services does not imply that states can evade their responsibility for the treatment of prisoners,​[14]​ or for the accessibility of health care facilities. With respect to health, the ESC Committee has stated that: 

‘While only States are parties to the Covenant and thus ultimately accountable for compliance with it, all members of society – individuals, including health professionals, families, local communities, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, as well as the private business sector – have responsibilities regarding the realization of the right to health. State parties should therefore provide an environment which facilitates the discharge of these responsibilities.’​[15]​

Enabling the private sector to provide services does not diminish the obligations of states under human rights instruments. They continue to have an obligation to monitor and regulate the conduct of non-state actors to ensure that they do not violate human rights.​[16]​ 

The above examples illustrate that much progress has been made in defining the responsibilities of states to protect individuals against human rights violations by non-state actors, and to hold states accountable at the international level for such acts. Since the 1970s, various initiatives have been taken in an attempt to formulate human rights obligations for non-state actors, especially transnational corporations. The following sections focus on such initiatives and will examine to what extent obligations under human rights law for non-state actors are emerging. 

A preliminary question we need to ask ourselves is whether the changing role of the non-state actors that have a capacity to violate human rights implies that they should be involved in lawmaking. Clapham suggests to uphold as a starting point the principles and rules of international public international law with its origins in the lawmaking power of the state. We agree with this view as well as with his argument that at the same time some of the obligations that have traditionally only been applied to states, should also be applied to non-state actors.​[17]​ New standards are not necessary.


Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises​[18]​

As a result of various widely publicised disastrous incidents, such as the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogonis that was connected to Shell’s operations in Nigeria, the Bhopal disaster and the operation of UNOCAL in Myanmar, transnational corporations were called on to recognise that they do have obligations to respect human rights. Efforts have been made to persuade them to adopt their own rules, and voluntary codes of conduct have come into existence. However, these apply only for the corporation that has drafted them and consequently there are many different codes with different scopes of application. While some refer to human rights norms, others do not, or only in the most general terms. Additionally, many problems exist with respect to the monitoring of such codes, which is often not regulated at all, or not entrusted to an independent institution.​[19]​ Another argument not to aim for these institutions to be lawmakers is that the problem is not so much in the formulation of the norms, but rather in their application by non-state actors. It would therefore be more pragmatic and appropriate to seek to apply existing standards.

At the international level various efforts have been made to regulate to some extent the activities of businesses. These include the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises​[20]​ and the ILO (International Labour Organisation) Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy.​[21]​ Another interesting example of a voluntary initiative existing within the framework of the United Nations is the Global Compact. This has been initiated by the UN Secretary-General to enhance the awareness of businesses regarding their role in the field of human rights. Within the framework of the Global Compact, businesses commit themselves to advance ten universal principles in the areas of human rights, labour, the environment and anticorruption. The overall goal is to ‘help realize the Secretary-General’s vision: a more sustainable and inclusive global economy’.​[22]​ The first two principles of the Global Compact deal with human rights; stating that businesses should ‘support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights within their sphere of influence’ and ‘make sure they are not complicit in human rights abuses’.​[23]​ As of the beginning of 2007, over 2,900 businesses in 100 countries around the world have joined this initiative.​[24]​ It is relatively easy for businesses to join the Global Compact. They must send a letter to the UN Secretary-General expressing support for the Global Compact and its principles and set in motion changes to business operations so that the Global Compact and its principles become part of strategy, culture and day-to-day operations. The business is expected to publicly advocate the Global Compact and its principles via communications vehicles such as press releases and speeches. In terms of ‘accountability’, it need do no more than publish in its annual report a description of the ways in which it is supporting the Global Compact and its principles.​[25]​ The Global Compact is entirely voluntary; there is no external monitoring or enforcement mechanism to establish whether or not the businesses that have committed themselves adhere in practice to the principles. Furthermore, there are no sanctions for businesses that do not comply with the principles, although there are some guidelines seeking to avoid abuse of the UN name and logo.​[26]​

An initiative of the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, a body composed of twenty-six independent experts, resulted in the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights in 2003.​[27]​ These Norms aim to be significantly less voluntary, and to establish obligations for businesses. They do, however, recognise states’ primary responsibility for the promotion and protection of human rights by stating: 

‘States have the primary responsibility to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law, including ensuring that transnational corporations and other business enterprises respect human rights. Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law, including the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups.’​[28]​

The Norms do not use the term ‘accountability’, but state that businesses have ‘obligations’ and ‘responsibilities’. This is more or less in line with Article 29 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that ‘[e]veryone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.’ This provision is crucial in the debate on the responsibilities of non-state actors. According to their preamble, the Norms aim to ‘contribute to the making and development of international law as to those responsibilities and obligations’. The language used in the Norms is quite similar to language used in human rights instruments applying to states. The Norms do not explicitly address violence against women, but contain some provisions that may be relevant. For example, Article 2 provides that transnational corporations and other business enterprises ‘shall ensure equality of opportunity and treatment’. Article 7 states that transnational corporations and other business enterprises ‘shall provide a safe and healthy working environment’, which includes, presumably, the obligation to prevent and punish sexual harassment at the workplace. 

The Norms as they currently stand do not provide protection to many jobs in which women traditionally work. The Norms have defined a transnational corporation as ‘an economic entity operating in more than one country or a cluster of economic entities operating in two or more countries, whatever their legal form, whether in their home country or country of activity, and whether taken individually or collectively’, whereas ‘other business enterprise’ includes ‘any business entity, regardless of the international or domestic nature of its activities, including a transnational corporation, contractor, subcontractor, supplier, licensee or distributor; the corporate, partnership, or other legal form used to establish the business entity; and the nature of the ownership of the entity’.​[29]​ This implies that jobs such as waitressing, nursing, cooking and domestic work in private households do not fall within the scope of the Norms. 

The Norms seek adherence from businesses. Under Article 15 they are encouraged to ‘adopt, disseminate and implement internal rules of operation in compliance with the Norms’ and to establish their own monitoring system. As to external monitoring, the Norms provide in Article 16 that businesses shall be:

‘subject to periodic monitoring and verification by United Nations, other international and national mechanisms already in existence or yet to be created, regarding application of the Norms. This monitoring shall be transparent and independent and take into account input from stakeholders (including non-governmental organisations) and as a result of complaints of violations of these Norms. Further, transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall conduct periodic evaluations concerning the impact of their own activities on human rights under these Norms.’ 

According to their principal drafter, David Weissbrodt, ‘the many implementation provisions show that they amount to more than aspirational statements of desired conduct’.​[30]​

It is quite unlikely, however, that the Norms will be adopted by a political organ of the United Nations. After their adoption by the UN Sub-Commission in 2003, the Norms were submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights. According to the Commission on Human Rights, the Norms contain ‘useful elements and ideas for consideration by the Commission’, but it also stated the Norms had ‘not been requested by the Commission and, as a draft proposal, has no legal standing, and that the Sub-Commission should not perform any monitoring function in this regard’.​[31]​ In 2005, the Commission on Human Rights decided to appoint a Special Representative on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, with the following mandate: 

‘(a) To identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and accountability for transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights;
(b) To elaborate on the role of States in effectively regulating and adjudicating the role of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights, including through international cooperation;
(c) To research and clarify the implications for transnational corporations and other business enterprises of concepts such as “complicity” and “sphere of influence”;
(d) To develop materials and methodologies for undertaking human rights impact assessments of the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises;
(e) To compile a compendium of best practices of States and transnational corporations and other business enterprises.’​[32]​

The Commission on Human Rights, and its successor the Human Rights Council, organs composed of states, was clearly not prepared to adopt a document such as the Norms; in the resolution establishing the Special Representative’s mandate the Norms are not even mentioned. The Special Representative, appointed by the Commission, John Ruggie, has made clear that he will not advocate the Norms, nor strive for their adoption. In his interim report he has expressed severe criticism on the Norms. In his view, ‘its exaggerated legal claims and conceptual ambiguities created confusion and doubt even among many mainstream international lawyers and other impartial observers’.​[33]​ He argues that the claim ‘that international law has been transformed to the point where it can be said that the broad array of international human rights attach direct legal obligations to corporations’ finds no support in international law.​[34]​ He also holds the view that the Norms inaccurately distribute human rights responsibilities to states and corporations.​[35]​ The Norms will not constitute a basis for moving his mandate forward.​[36]​






The activities of organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF can have great impact on the enjoyment of human rights. The ESC Committee has acknowledged this problem on various occasions. For example, in its general comment on the right to work, it observed that: 

‘The strategies, programmes and policies adopted by States parties under structural adjustment programmes should not interfere with their core obligations in relation to the right to work and impact negatively on the right to work of women, young persons and the disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups.’​[37]​ 

The extent to which international financial institutions have an obligation to respect and protect human rights is subject of debate. According to a recent study, the core minimum obligation incumbent directly on the Bank and Fund as specialised agencies of the UN system and subjects of international law is ‘a duty of vigilance to ensure that their policies and programs do not facilitate breaches of their member states’ human rights treaty obligations’.​[38]​ 

In its general comments, the ESC Committee as a rule includes a section entitled ‘Obligations of actors other than states parties’. For example, in its general comment on the right to health, the ESC Committee not only points to the technical assistance and cooperation that the World Health Organisation can offer in formulating and implementing their right to health national strategies,​[39]​ it also states that the relevant specialised agencies ‘should cooperate effectively with states parties, building on their respective expertise, in relation to the implementation of the right to health at the national level, with due respect to their individual mandates’.​[40]​ It observes that the international financial institutions should pay greater attention to the protection of the right to health in their lending policies, credit agreements and structural adjustment programmes. The ESC Committee announces that in examining the reports of states parties and their ability to meet their obligations under Article 12, it will consider the effects of the assistance provided by all other actors, including the role of health professional associations and other non-governmental organisations in relation to the states’ obligations under Article 12. It does not, however, specify how it intends to implement this. In its activities under the reporting procedure, we see that the ESC Committee also points to states parties’ responsibilities as members of the financial institutions to use their influence to contribute to improving the human rights performance of these international organisations. Upon conclusion of the examination of the report of the United Kingdom, for example, the Committee encouraged the state party:

‘as a member of international financial institutions, in particular the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to do all it can to ensure that the policies and decisions of those organizations are in conformity with the obligations of States parties under the Covenant, in particular with the obligations contained in articles 2.1, 11.2, 15.4 and 23 concerning international assistance and cooperation.’​[41]​

In its General Comment on Plans of Action for Primary Education, the ESC Committee called on international agencies to assist states parties to the greatest extent possible to meet their obligations on an urgent basis.​[42]​ Also the Committee on the Rights of the Child addresses the specialised agencies. In its General Comment on General Measures of Implementation for the Convention on the Rights of the Child it stated: 

‘In their promotion of international cooperation and technical assistance, all UN and UN-related agencies should be guided by the Convention and should mainstream children’s rights throughout their activities. They should seek to ensure within their influence that international cooperation is targeted at supporting States to fulfil their obligations under the Convention. Similarly the World Bank Group, International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organisation should ensure that their activities related to international cooperation and economic development give primary consideration to the best interests of children and promote full implementation of the Convention.’​[43]​

A group of experts developed the Tilburg Guiding Principles on World Bank, IMF and Human Rights on human rights obligations for international financial institutions. According to these principles, the World Bank and the IMF should integrate human rights considerations into all aspects of their operations and internal functioning. The prevention of violations should receive high priority, and if violations occur, measures for mitigating the impact thereof and mechanisms of accountability and redress should be put into place.​[44]​ They are under an ‘international legal obligation to take full responsibility for human rights respect in situations where the institutions’ own projects, policies or programmes negatively impact or undermine the enjoyment of human rights’.​[45]​ Under existing arrangements, however, such obligations are not practically enforceable.​[46]​ 

The World Bank recognises the relevance of human rights to its activities. It holds the view that ‘creating the conditions for the attainment of human rights is a central and irreducible goal of development’.​[47]​ The organisation is, however, very cautious in formulating any obligations or responsibilities. According to Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank Group, Ana Palacio, the World Bank’s role is ‘a facilitative one, in helping our members realise their human rights obligations’. She stated that ‘human rights would not be the basis for an increase in Bank conditionalities, nor should they be seen as an agenda that could present an obstacle for disbursement or increase the cost of doing business’.​[48]​ She admitted that ‘[a]lthough the Bank’s pronouncements on human rights have always been broadly supportive, they never affirmed in concrete terms that the Bank had a specific role to play in relation to human rights as legal principles, or as legal obligations.’ Yet, she also stated that ‘the Bank can and sometimes should take human rights into consideration as part of its decision-making process’.​[49]​ 

Also in considering the extent of responsibilities of international organisations, states continue to be primary responsible: ‘States cannot “delegate” human rights obligations to, for instance, international financial institutions and relieve themselves of these obligations.’​[50]​ Nevertheless, it is recognised that organisations whose activities impact on human rights bear responsibilities of their own. Because of their position within the United Nations system, specialised agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF have certain obligations. Under traditional international law, the Bank is accountable to its member states; the member states are accountable to the people. Within the World Bank, the establishment of the Inspection Panel is a major step forward, allowing for direct access by affected people to the Bank, subject to certain conditions. As to subject matter: 

‘The affected party must demonstrate that its rights or interests have been or are likely to be directly affected by an action of omission of the Bank as a result of a failure of the Bank to follow its operational policies and procedures with respect to the design, appraisal and/or implementation of a project financed by the Bank (including situations where the Bank is alleged to have failed in its follow-up on the borrower’s obligations under loan agreements with respect to such policies and procedures) provided in all cases that such failure has had, or threatens to have, a material adverse effect.’​[51]​

The Inspection Panel can test compliance of the Bank with its own policies, not whether the Bank has violated international (human rights) law. People can, however, argue that the harm they suffered consisted of human rights violations. The panel takes up human rights violations to the extent that they result from an infringement of Bank rules.​[52]​ The procedure opens political space for the voices of marginalised communities; groups that both borrower and the Bank ‘were happy to ignore’ become visible.​[53]​

In this connection, it is worth mentioning that the International Law Commission is currently studying the issue of ‘Responsibility of international organisations’ as part of its long-term programme of work.​[54]​ One of the provisionally adopted Articles provides that:

‘There is an internationally wrongful act of an international organization when conduct consisting of an action or omission:
(a) Is attributable to the international organization under international law; and 
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that international
organization.’​[55]​ 

It will thus be crucial to establish what does, and what does not, constitute an ‘obligation’, an issue that is not solved by the Draft Articles. 

We see some fundamental changes. While not accepting concrete obligations, or expressing a ‘consent to be bound’ to human rights treaties, at least the World Bank has accepted that it has responsibilities to respect human rights and to prevent violations. The mere establishment of the Inspection Panel is a step forward, and those submitting claims to it could phrase these in human rights terms where appropriate, and refer to instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, thus inviting the Bank to respond.


A Special Case: UNMIK Before the Human Rights Committee

Particularly worth mentioning is a recent initiative of the Human Rights Committee. During consideration of the initial report of Serbia and Montenegro under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Human Rights Committee took note of the state party’s explanation that it was unable to report on the discharge of its own responsibilities with regard to the human rights situation in Kosovo, and suggested that, owing to the fact that civil authority is exercised in Kosovo by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the Committee may invite UNMIK to submit to it a supplementary report on the human rights situation in Kosovo. 






The above sketched some recent developments with regard to obligations of non-state actors, and monitoring of implementation of obligations. While full accountability in the sense of being called to account before an international organ may not be achieved for some time, clearly, the notion of responsibility has been accepted by international organisations and businesses. International criminal law has imposed accountability on individuals who have committed grave human rights violations for which they can be prosecuted before an international tribunal. Establishing accountability depends to a large extent on the willingness of powerful non-state actors such as international organisations and businesses to be held accountable. This willingness has been advanced by initiatives from non-governmental organisations and academics that have demonstrated that their powers and – in the case of international organisations – their place in the United Nations system entail responsibilities. The aim should be to seek their adherence to existing standards, and not to have them create their own norms, which undoubtedly would lead to confusion and possibly to watering down of standards.
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